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Abstract
A government designs anonymous income transfers between a continuum of citizens whose income val-
uation is privately known. When transfers are deterministic, the incentive constraints imply equal treatment 
independently of the government’s taste for redistribution. We study whether random transfers may locally 
improve upon the egalitarian outcome. A suitable Taylor expansion offers an approximation of the utility 
function by a quasilinear function. The methodology developed by Myerson to deal with incentive con-
straints then yields a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a socially useful randomization. 
When this condition is met a large set of lotteries are locally improving. A special menu made of two lot-
teries only is of interest: all the agents with low risk aversion receive the same random transfer, financed by 
a deterministic tax paid by the high risk aversion agents.
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It is known that in a second-best world a principal may find it valuable to propose random 
contracts to the agents. For instance, in the presence of asymmetric information, risk can be 
used to relax the incentive constraints (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). In Gauthier and Laroque
(2014) we give a necessary and sufficient condition for useful/useless randomization near a de-
terministic optimum, but our previous analysis only applies to well-behaved problems where the 
constraints are qualified, i.e., the gradients of the binding constraints at the optimum are linearly 
independent. In this note we deal with a case where the constraints are not qualified. We consider 
a government that allocates a given sum of money deterministically between potential recipients 
with different income valuations. As observed by Lerner (1944) only equal sharing can be im-
plemented if valuations are not observed by the government and recipients always prefer more 
income to less. The constraint set reduces to a single point and qualification is not met.
In this setup a random allocation may allow the government to screen individuals according 
to their attitudes toward risk. Pestieau et al. (2002) provide a necessary condition for local ran-
domized redistribution to improve upon the equal sharing outcome. However their proof uses a 
Taylor expansion where the variance of the lotteries is negligible and so it does not give tools to 
design the optimal differential risk exposure. One contribution of our note is to provide a class 
of expansions where the noise component is first-order non-negligible. An appealing feature of 
this approach is that it enables us to apply the standard quasilinear toolkit of contract theory de-
veloped by Myerson (1982). This yields a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of 
locally improving stochastic allocations. The social weights put on the agents with the smallest 
risk aversions must be large enough that a transfer in their favour more than compensates for the 
extra randomness required to meet the incentive constraints.
There are many ways to design the locally improving randomizations. Still it turns out that 
there is no loss in generality in limiting the attention to simple schemes that work as follows. The 
agents have to choose between two (small) deviations from the status quo. One is a certain tax, 
the other is a random transfer with positive expectation and variance. The deviations are built so 
that all the agents with a risk aversion larger than a threshold choose to pay the certain tax, while 
the agents with a smaller risk aversion take the other (risky) option.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays down the deterministic framework, which is 
extended to a random environment in Section 3. Section 4 presents an example. Finally Section 5
states and proves the main propositions.
2. Deterministic redistribution
A government allocates a total fixed income y to agents who differ in their utilities for income. 
There is a continuum of agents with total unit mass. The utility of a type θ agent is u(y, θ) when 
her income is y, y in R+. The parameter θ is distributed on a closed bounded interval , with a 
positive continuous probability density function f (·) and cumulative distribution function F (·). 
Utility is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and concave in income: u′y(y, θ) > 0 and 
u′′yy(y, θ) < 0 for all y and θ .
Each agent is supposed to know her own type. In the first-best the government also knows this 
type and allocates y∗(θ) to agent θ . Denoting a(θ) the social weight of type θ , the menu (y∗(θ))
maximizes∫
a(θ)u(y(θ), θ) dF(θ) (1)

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
y(θ) dF(θ) ≤ y. (2)
The first-best optimum (y∗(θ)) is characterized by (2) at equality and the first-order conditions 
a(θ)u′y(y∗(θ), θ) = a(θˆ)u′y(y∗(θˆ), θˆ ) for all θ and θˆ in . The tastes for redistribution reflected 
in (a(θ)) and heterogeneity in utility typically lead to an unequal division of income at the 
first-best.
As observed by Lerner (1944) the implementation of the first-best solution crucially requires 
that the government observes agents’ types. Otherwise the optimal income distribution maxi-
mizes (1) subject to (2) and the incentive constraints
u(y(θ), θ) ≥ u(y(θˆ), θ) for all θ and θˆ .
Since utility is increasing in income, these constraints are satisfied if and only if y(θ) = y(θˆ) for 
all θ and θˆ . Feasibility then gives
y(θ) = y for all θ. (3)
In this Lerner (deterministic second-best) optimum, income is equalized independently of the 
tastes for redistribution.
3. Random redistribution
We extend the power of the government and allow for randomized redistribution. The govern-
ment can now design a menu of lotteries, such that every individual must choose some lottery in 
this menu. Given the random draw from the lottery, there is commitment from both the govern-
ment and the players to conform to the outcome. Suppose also that a law of large number holds, 
so that with independent draws the cost of the lottery is equal to its mathematical expectation.
A menu of lotteries (y˜(θ)) improves upon the reference Lerner optimum if∫

a(θ)E
[
u(y + y˜(θ), θ)] dF(θ) >
∫

a(θ)u(y, θ)dF(θ).
In addition, the menu must satisfy the feasibility constraint∫

E
[
y˜(θ)
]
dF(θ) = 0,
and the incentive constraints
E
[
u(y + y˜(θ), θ)]≥ E [u(y + y˜(θˆ ), θ)] for all θ and θˆ .
We consider small randomizations around the deterministic Lerner optimum. In the previous 
literature, e.g., Gjesdal (1982), Pestieau et al. (2002) or Gauthier and Laroque (2014), small 
randomizations obtain whenever the support of the lotteries in the menu (y˜(θ)) is close to 0. In 
a Lerner setup this characterization is not well suited because the noise component then appears 
as a second-order negligible term that cannot be explicitly exploited by the government. Indeed, 
with such a characterization of small lotteries, a Taylor expansion yields
E
[
u(y + y˜(θ), θ)]= u(y, θ) + m(θ)u′ (y, θ) + o (y˜(θ)2),y
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neglects other higher order terms, the incentive constraints for type θ reduce to
m(θ) ≥ m(θˆ) for all θˆ . (4)
Reproducing the same exercise for type θˆ immediately implies m(θ) = m(θˆ) for all θ and θˆ , and 
by the feasibility constraint m(θ) = 0 for all θ . It is unclear how introducing a nonzero variance 
could then improve welfare.
One contribution of our note is to provide a class of small randomizations that make the 
variance of the transfer a first-order term. Let v ≡ var [y˜] be the variance of a typical lottery. At 
the Lerner optimum, y˜(θ) = m(θ) = 0 and v(θ) = 0 for all θ . We consider a family of menus 
(y˜λ(θ)) indexed by a real parameter λ, λ ≥ 0. The lottery designed for a type θ has mean and 
variance (λm(θ), λv(θ)). Small randomizations obtain when λ is small enough. For this class of 
small randomizations a second-order Taylor expansion yields
u(y + y, θ) = u(y, θ) + u′y(y, θ)y +
1
2
u′′yy(y, θ)y2 + o(y2),
for all y close to 0, which implies
E
[
u(y + y˜λ(θ), θ)
]= u(y, θ) + u′y(y, θ)λ
[
m(θ) − r(θ)
2
(
λm(θ)2 + v(θ)
)]
+E
[
λ2o(y˜2)
]
,
where
r(θ) = −u
′′
yy(y, θ)
u′y(y, θ)
is the coefficient of (absolute) risk aversion of a type θ individual evaluated at the Lerner out-
come. When λ is close enough to 0, we have
E
[
u(y + y˜λ(θ), θ)
] u(y, θ) + u′y(y, θ)λ
[
m(θ) − r(θ)
2
v(θ)
]
.
Therefore the menu of lotteries (y˜λ(θ)) improves upon the deterministic Lerner optimum if and 
only if the change in the social objective is positive,
λ
∫

α(θ)
[
m(θ) − r(θ)
2
v(θ)
]
dF(θ) > 0, (5)
where α(θ) = a(θ)u′y(y, θ) is the marginal social weight of type θ . Such a menu must also satisfy 
the feasibility constraint∫

m(θ)dF(θ) = 0, (6)
and the incentive constraints
m(θ) − r(θ)
2
v(θ) ≥ m(θˆ) − r(θ)
2
v(θˆ) for all θ and θˆ . (7)
With this class of small randomizations the variances of income transfers explicitly enter the 
incentive constraints (7). In the absence of noise these constraints reduce to (4) and prevent any 
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schemes consistent with incentive compatibility.
For small randomizations the menu of lotteries (y˜λ(θ)) leads to incentive constraints with 
the quasilinear shape used in the toolkit of contract theory developed by Myerson (1981). Usual 
textbook arguments (see, e.g., chapter 2 in Salanié, 2005) lead to define
U(r) = sup
θ∈
m(θ) − r
2
v(θ).
The function U is convex nonincreasing in r , almost everywhere differentiable with v(θ(r)) =
−2U ′(r), where θ(r) is the best report of an agent whose risk aversion is r . Moreover m(θ(r)) is 
equal to U(r) + rv(θ(r))/2. This construction makes it clear that the government can only screen 
agents according to their risk aversion. Since there is no loss of generality in working with direct 
menus parametrized in r , r in R = [r inf, rsup], in the remainder of the paper we use (m(r), v(r))
to describe the menus of lotteries, with a slight abuse of notation. The problem in (5), (6) and (7)
can be restated as looking for a profile (m(r), v(r)) such that
∫
R
α(r)
[
m(r) − r
2
v(r)
]
dG(r) > 0, (8)
∫
R
m(r)dG(r) = 0, (9)
and
m(r) − r
2
v(r) ≥ m(rˆ) − r
2
v(rˆ) for all r and rˆ , (10)
where G(r) stands for the proportion of agents with risk aversion less than r at the Lerner opti-
mum, and α(r) is the average social weight of the agents with risk aversion r . We denote A(r)
the aggregate social weight of the individuals of risk aversion smaller than r ,
A(r) =
r∫
r inf
α(z)dG(z).
The weights are normalized so that A(rsup) = 1.
Although the set of allocations consistent with incentive compatibility is larger than what 
is seen in the deterministic Lerner world, incentive constraints restrict possible redistribution. 
These restrictions, which follow from standard arguments, are given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Consider a family of menus (y˜λ(r)) with mean variance (λm(r), λv(r)), for λ ≥ 0. 
Suppose that they satisfy the incentive constraints (10). For two types r and rˆ such that r ≤ rˆ , 
we have m(r) ≥ m(rˆ) and v(r) ≥ v(rˆ). The equality v(r) = v(rˆ) implies m(r) = m(rˆ). The 
contribution of an agent with type θ to the change in social welfare from the Lerner optimum is 
λα(r)U(r), where
U(r) = m(r) − r
2
v(r)
is nonincreasing in r .
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fare toward least risk aversion types, independently of the social tastes (α(r)) for redistribution. 
Low risk aversion types receive transfers with higher means, and these transfers must be random 
not to attract higher risk aversion types.
From Lemma 1 we also see that the incentive constraints imply that the variance v(r) is 
nonincreasing in r . The minimal variance therefore is v(rsup). A direct examination of the system 
(8), (9) and (10) shows that any solution (m(r), v(r)) with v(rsup) > 0 can be improved upon by 
keeping the function m unchanged and translating the function v by −v(rsup). Extra randomness, 
above the requirements associated with incentives, is of no use, and in the remainder of the paper 
we shall work with
v(rsup) = 0.
4. A simple reform
This section considers a menu made of only two choices. The first one is a lottery y˜ that 
has mathematical expectation m and variance v, a positive number. The second one is a sure 
transfer m. For the small lotteries considered in Lemma 1 the agents who prefer the lottery y˜
have risk aversion r ≤ r∗ where
m = m − r
∗
2
v. (11)
We limit our attention to cases where G(r∗) is positive. Otherwise all agents choose (m, 0), and 
feasibility implies that m is equal to zero, so that the outcome is the Lerner optimum. From (8)
the menu improves upon Lerner if
r∗∫
r inf
α(r)
(
m − r
2
v
)
dG(r) +
rsup∫
r∗
α(r)mdG(r) > 0. (12)
Using the feasibility constraint,
G(r∗)m + [1 − G(r∗)]m = 0,
and the definition of the threshold r∗ given in (11) we get
m = −G(r∗) r
∗
2
v and m = [1 − G(r∗)] r
∗
2
v.
Reintroducing the expressions of m and m into (12), the change in social welfare brought by the 
menu of lotteries is positive if and only if
1
2
K(r∗)v > 0,
where
K(r) = r [A(r) − G(r)] −
r∫
zα(z) dG(z). (13)r inf
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Lemma 2. A sufficient condition for a random redistribution to improve upon the Lerner deter-
ministic outcome is
K(r∗) > 0. (14)
The term A(r∗) represents the aggregate social gain that results from giving one unit of money 
to each individual whose risk aversion is less than r∗, while G(r∗) is the total cost of these 
transfers (the size of the population is normalized to 1). Hence the difference between A(r∗) and 
G(r∗) is positive when individuals with risk aversion smaller than r∗ have higher social values 
than the others. It is clear from (13) and (14) that this pattern of social weight makes useful 
randomization more likely.
The last sum in K(r∗) depends on the shape of the left tail of the risk aversion distribution. 
In the special case where all the individuals with a risk aversion less than r∗ are risk neutral 
(there is a positive mass of agents at r inf = 0 and no agent has 0 < r < r∗), this sum is 0, so that 
randomization is useful whenever the social weight of the risk neutral agents is larger than 1.
5. Improving randomizations
We consider now general menus (m(r), v(r)) and provide necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a local improvement.
Proposition 1. Consider a profile of small lotteries associated with the mean-variance menu 
(m(r), v(r)), satisfying the feasibility and incentive compatibility requirements. If the function 
K is continuously differentiable, the profile induces a change in social welfare upon the Lerner 
optimum equal to
1
2
∫
R
K ′(r)v(r) dr, (15)
where K ′(r) = A(r) − G(r) − rg(r) is the first derivative of K(r).
Proof. Appealing to the powerful tool developed by Myerson (1981) one can check that the 
profiles (U(r)) satisfying incentive constraints are such that
U(r) = U(r inf) −
r∫
r inf
v(z)
2
dz, (16)
where U(r inf) is derived from feasibility requirements,
U(r inf) = 1
2
∫
R
[[1 − G(r)]v(r) − rv(r)g(r)] dr . (17)
Thus the change in social welfare is
∫
α(r)
⎡
⎢⎣U(r inf) −
r∫
inf
v(z)
2
dz
⎤
⎥⎦ dG(r). (18)R r
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∫
R
α(r)
r∫
r inf
v(z) dz dG(r) =
∫
R
v(r)
rsup∫
r
α(z) dG(z) dr =
∫
R
[1 − A(r)]v(r) dr,
where the last step uses the normalization made on social weights (their sum over the whole 
population is 1). From this relation and (17), the inequality (18) is equivalent to (15). 
A pure utilitarian government, with α(r) constant equal to 1, has A(r) equal to G(r), so that 
K(r) is nonpositive. It has no possibility to improve welfare with lotteries. More generally, a high 
social value put on those who have least risk aversion is needed to get a social improvement upon 
the deterministic Lerner outcome: there is no useful (local) randomization when A(r) ≤ G(r) for 
all r . This confirms the insights obtained from the sufficient condition given in Lemma 2.
Proposition 1 can be used to test whether a given menu satisfying (9) and (10) yields a welfare 
improvement. It is however difficult to exploit immediately (15) to discuss the shape of improv-
ing menus since incentive constraints put restrictions on the variance profile. By Lemma 1 the 
variance v(r) must decrease with risk aversion r , and so it only has at most countably many 
discontinuities. From now on, following the literature since Guesnerie and Laffont (1984), we 
limit our attention to variance profiles which have at most a finite number of discontinuities.1
To make these restrictions explicit in (15), we let D stand for the set of risk aversions where a 
discontinuity in the variance profile occurs. Accounting for the fact that the discontinuities have 
a zero contribution to the sum, (15) becomes
1
2
∫
R\D
K ′(r)v(r)dr. (19)
For ri ∈D, let
v(r−i ) = limr→ri
r<ri
v(r) and v(r+i ) = limr→ri
r>ri
v(r).
Integration by parts on the typical interval 
[
r+i , r
−
i+1
]
yields
r−i+1∫
r+i
K ′(r)v(r)dr = [K(r)v(r)]r
−
i+1
r+i
−
r−i+1∫
r+i
K(r)v′(r)dr.
Using K(r inf) = 0 and v(rsup) = 0 allows us to rewrite (19) as
1
2
⎡
⎢⎣∑
D
K(ri)
[
v(r−i ) − v(r+i )
]−
∫
R\D
K(r)v′(r)dr
⎤
⎥⎦ . (20)
This yields another formulation of (15).
1 Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) seem to be the first to point out the need for such a condition, see their footnotes 3 
and 6. This restriction seems to be mild, and to the best of our knowledge there is no example in the literature where it 
binds. It is widely used, see e.g. Laffont and Martimort (2002), page 135.
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(m(r), v(r)) satisfying the feasibility and incentive compatibility constraints where the variance 
v(r) has a finite number of discontinuities. Let D = {ri | i ∈ I } be the set of risk aversion r where 
a discontinuity in v(r) occurs. A lottery profile (m(r), v(r)) induces a change in social welfare 
upon the Lerner optimum given by (20).
The condition (20) can be easily interpreted using a marginal argument. Let r∗ be a point 
where K is positive, if any. At this point we are free to change −v′ provided that it stays posi-
tive. This allows to introduce a discontinuity on v. Starting from rsup we have v unchanged on 
[r∗, rsup] and increased by  for r smaller than r∗. This transformation translates into a change 
of welfare of
−
2
r∫
r inf
zα(z) dG(z).
This is the last term in the expression of K , scaled by the factor /2. This first step is incomplete, 
since the modified menu is not incentive compatible. In particular the utility of type r∗ has 
decreased by r∗/2 while the utilities of all types greater than r∗ are kept at their initial values. 
We have to make type r∗ indifferent between what she gets and what her immediate neighbour 
r∗ + ε gets, which by construction is unchanged from the initial condition. This can only be 
done through a deterministic transfer of money which compensates her for the randomness: it 
should be equal to r∗/2. Now all the types smaller than r∗ are exposed to the same change in 
randomness than r∗, and so each one must also be given r∗/2 to keep incentive compatibility 
with type r∗. Summing up these transfers, we get that they cost
G(r∗)r∗ 
2
from the budget constraint, while they increase social welfare by
A(r∗)r∗ 
2
.
The normalization A(rsup) = 1 implies a marginal cost of public funds equal to 1. Thus, all things 
considered, the change in social welfare is equal to K(r∗)/2: the change is improving provided 
K(r∗) is positive.
From Proposition 2, a natural candidate for an improving menu involves v′(r) < 0 on the set 
K(r) > 0 and v′(r) = 0 otherwise. But this is by no means the only possible choice: there is a 
large family of possibly complicated menus that locally improve upon the Lerner outcome when 
K(r) > 0 for some r . Indeed, by Lemma 1, any nonpositive v′ would fit on the set K(r) > 0. 
In addition, the overall inequality (20) can be satisfied with v′ negative small in absolute value 
on the set K(r) ≤ 0. However it is immediate from (20) that one can always consider reforms 
analyzed in Section 4, where v has a single point of discontinuity at a point r∗ where K(r∗) > 0. 
For such reforms one can set v′(r) = 0 for every r 
= r∗, so that the change in social welfare (20)
reduces to
1
2
K(r∗)v(r∗).
The agents then separate into two subpopulations, with risk aversions below or above r . The 
former all are assigned a lottery, while the later pay a nonrandom tax.
716 S. Gauthier, G. Laroque / Journal of Economic Theory 169 (2017) 707–716Remark 1. The observation that there is no loss to consider the class of simple reforms analyzed 
in Section 4 can be used to assess the effectiveness of the randomization. The tax supported by 
the risk averse agents is | m |= G(r∗)r∗v. In the case where the government only cares about 
the individuals with least risk aversion, the gain in social welfare is K (r∗) v/2. The effective-
ness of the reform, measured as the ratio of the gain in welfare per unit of taxation is equal to 
(1/G(r∗) − 1), which is infinite for G (r∗) close enough to zero.2 Such reforms thus yield a 
large welfare gain compared to the size of the perturbation.
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